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FOREWORD: IS JUSTICE JUST US?
Christopher Slobogin*
In all cases of divergence between the standard of the common-law
and the standard of the public, it goes without saying that the latter will
prevail in the end. Sooner or later what public opinion demands will be
recognized and enforced by the courts. A Bench and Bar trained in
individualist theories and firm in the persuasion that the so-called legal
justice is an absolute and a necessary standard, from which there may
be no departure without the destruction of the legal order, may retard
but cannot prevent progress to the newer standard recognized by the
sociologist.
Roscoe Pound, 1908'
The certitude evinced by this passage, written by the founder of
sociological jurisprudence almost 100 years ago, belies its highly pro-
vocative nature. Is it true that law inexorably finds common ground with
"public standards"? Isn't it possible that, to the extent there is a synergy
between legal and lay precepts, the impetus is in the other direction,
with the law influencing the citizenry? More generally, is the conver-
gence between law and popular will that Dean Pound described a good
thing, as he implies? If so, should the law consciously incorporate lay
views into its calculus? Or should it resist and try to change public
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College
of Law. I would like to thank Dan Simon for his feedback on this article.
1. Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607, 615
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opinion when legal theorists or policymakers think there are good
grounds for doing so? In answering the latter two questions, should we
care how much the public understands about fairness concerns and
utilitarian, cost-benefit analysis? Assuming the "standard of the public"
is an important or dispositive guidepost for the law, should we make
attempts, outside of the political process, to discern what it is? If so,
how?
This Symposium issue of the Hofstra Law Review, which is based
on a program that took place at the American Association of Law
Schools' Annual Meeting in January 2000, is devoted to a discussion of
these issues.2 The springboard for this discussion is a seminal book
written by Paul Robinson, a law professor at Northwestern Law School,
and John Darley, a social psychologist at Princeton University, entitled
Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law
As the title suggests, this book provides a considerable amount of em-
pirical information about how the public views various aspects of the
criminal law.
More specifically, Justice, Liability, and Blame describes eighteen
studies exploring lay perspectives on issues ranging from attempt li-
ability to sentencing policy.4 Some of the findings reported in the book
are dramatic, because they suggest that lay views often diverge substan-
tially from Dean Pound's "common-law" and even more frequently de-
part from the conclusions of the lawyers, judges and professors of the
American Law Institute who worked on the highly influential Model
Penal Code ("MPC"). For instance, Robinson and Darley's subjects
vigorously rejected the MPC's stance that the punishment for attempt
should be identical to the punishment for the completed offense and,
contrary to both the MPC and the common-law, believed that renuncia-
tion of a completed offense should result in significant mitigation.6 They
also required actual encouragement or assistance for accomplice iabil-
2. The panel, entitled Is Justice Just Us?: Using Social Science to Inform the Substantive
Criminal Law, was sponsored by the Criminal Justice Section and the Social Science and Law
Section of the American Association of Law Schools. It featured Paul Robinson, Deborah Denno,
Dan Kahan, Christopher Slobogin (chair of the Criminal Justice Section), and Tom Tyler, with
Cheryl Hanna (chair of the Social Science and Law Section) as moderator.
3. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILrrY, AND BLAME: COMMUNITY
ViEws AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
4. See id.
5. MODEL PENAL CODE (1985).
6. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 3, at 1428. Throughout this paragraph of the
foreword, the description of the "views" of Robinson and Darley's subjects reports the majority
position; not all subjects agreed with the positions reported in the text.
[Vol. 28:601
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ity, thus rejecting the MPC's imposition of punishment for unsuccessful
complicity7 Further, in contrast to both the MPC and the common-law,
they recognized gradations of accomplice liability depending upon the
actual assistance provided, under no circumstances giving the accom-
plice the same punishment as the principal.' Also contrary to both the
MPC and the common-law, the subjects indicated that even a person
with no duty toward a drowning person should be liable for a failure to
save, except when there is a significant danger in doing so,9 and that
even a person with a significant duty to act and an ability to do so in an
easy and safe manner should not be punished as severely as one with the
same mental state who affirmatively commits the act.1" The subjects
were much more generous than the drafters of the MPC and somewhat
more willing than common-law courts to provide a justification defense,
whether in connection with the retreat doctrine, the use of deadly force,
or the defense of property." They also indicated that spousal rape and
rape involving homosexual couples deserved approximately equal pun-
ishment, contrary to the relevant MPC provisions, which treat spousal
rape more leniently and homosexual rape more harshly." As a final ex-
ample, Robinson and Darley's subjects roundly rejected the common-
law felony-murder doctrine by ascribing only manslaughter liability
when the felon negligently kills during a robbery and only negligent
homicide liability when a bystander kills a co-felon. 3 This brief synop-
sis describes only a fraction of the lay views uncovered by Robinson
and Darley, but it provides a sufficient flavor of the significant gaps
between those views and the MPC and common-law positions.
What should the law make of all this? We could throw out any
code provision that conflicts with the consensus of the public, as Dean
Pound seems to suggest. Or we could treat the empirical information as
interesting food for thought but otherwise ignore it. Finally, we could
adopt some sort of compromise, for instance, one that changes doctrine
only when lay views are consistent with plausible retributive or utilitar-
ian rationales, or only when those views indicate that the law is
"morally" outdated, as might be the case with the MPC's spousal rape
and homosexual rape provisions. Ultimately, we need to decide whether
7. See i at 33-42.
8. See id.
9. See id. at 42-50.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 54-79.
12. See id. at 161-69.
13. See id. at 161-81.
2000]
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retributive philosophy should pay attention to lay views and whether
utilitarian analysis should take into account the effect of ignoring lay
tastes.
In Justice, Liability, and Blame, Robinson and Darley appear to
adopt the position that community opinions should influence both types
of reasoning. With respect to retributive analysis, they state: "[I]f a rule
derived by desert theorists is judged overwhelmingly by the community
to be unjust, such disagreement may cast some doubt upon the accuracy
of the rule in assessing a person's moral blameworthiness, at least sug-
gesting that closer scrutiny of the reasoning behind the rule is re-
quired." 4 Further, when code drafters disagree about the "moral intui-
tions" of the community, "empirical findings ... should be of
considerable utility in resolving the controversy."'" With respect to the
utilitarian calculus, they suggest that a criminal code that departs sig-
nificantly from community views is likely to lose "moral credibility,"
and thus damage people's willingness to comply with the criminal law.'6
If the criminal law is perceived as unjustly criminalizing conduct, soci-
ety may "lose faith in the system-not only in the specific laws that lead
to the unjust result, but in the entire code and criminal justice system
enforcing that code."'" Conversely, if the system falls to criminalize
conduct that the public thinks should be sanctioned, "[t]he community is
likely to engage in extralegal vigilante actions, with all of the dangers
that that suggests."'8
In a previous review of Justice, Liability, and Blame, I expressed
doubts about both of these reasons for paying attention to positions en-
dorsed by the community.' 9 Put simply, I raised three concerns. In con-
sidering the advisability of relying on lay views for determining just de-
serts, I wondered whether ordinary citizens of the type polled by
Robinson and Darley have thought deeply enough about the relevant is-
sues, are sufficiently informed about the legal context in which a given
code provision operates, and can be trusted to report stable beliefs rather
than transient positions based on reactions to current events.20 On the
14. Id. at 6.
15. Id. at 214.
16. See id. at 6.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id.
19. See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substan-
tive Criminal Law, 87 L CumV. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315 (1996).
20. See id. at 323-26. Consider the following analogy. Generally we do not allow a criminal
defendant to make an important decision about waiving rights or asserting defenses unless, at a
minimum, he or she understands the risks and benefits of the decision, as well as of the altema-
[Vol. 28:601
HeinOnline  -- 28 Hofstra L. Rev. 604 1999-2000
IS JUSTICE JUST US?
loss of compliance claim, I conjectured that differences between lay and
code positions on arcane subjects such as the actus reus for attempt and
accomplice liability are unlikely to occasion the disruption hypothesized
by Robinson and Darley and that, in any event, education of the public,
rather than modification of the law, might be the better response to any
divergence.1 Finally, while recognizing the sophisticated manner in
which Robinson and Darley conducted their research, I pointed to sev-
eral potential problems in their method of surveying the public, includ-
ing the nature of their sample, the ambiguity of the grounds for the
subjects' choices, and the potentially weak external validity of re-
sponses to paper and pencil scenarios. In sum, while I found the find-
ings reported in Justice, Liability, and Blame extremely thought-
provoking, I did not think they should be given much weight in policy-
making circles.
The prestigious authors in this Symposium have their own views
regarding these issues. We are honored to have Paul Robinson, co-
author of Justice, Liability, and Blame and a prodigious writer on crimi-
nal law issues, as the initial contributor to the Symposium. In his article,
Robinson makes clear that he does not rely upon the first, deserts-
oriented, rationale for reliance on lay views, but continues to adhere
firmly to the utilitarian claim that attention to those views can enhance
the moral credibility of, and thus compliance with, the criminal law.?
Most of his article, however, is devoted to describing the methodology
used in the studies described in Justice, Liability, and Blame. For those
who have not read the book, this article is a useful synopsis of how the
studies were conducted. Robinson adds a discussion-not in the book-
about the difficulty of constructing scenarios that prevent subjects from
reading more into the facts than the researcher intended. Not only re-
searchers but hypothetical-obsessed law professors should find this por-
tion of the article enlightening.2?
fives, and has no fixed, false beliefs about relevant information. See Christopher Slobogin & Amy
Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Attorney's Fiduciary Duty to Clients with a Mental Disability,
68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1581, 1594-98 (2000). The same level of knowledge could be required of
those who make decisions about the content of the criminal code.
21. See Slobogin, supra note 19, at 326-27.
22. See id. at 327-32.
23. See Paul H. Robinson, Testing Lay Intuitions of Justice: How and Why?, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REV., 611,612-14 (2000).
24. See id. at 619-22.
25. Robinson elaborates on this issue in Paul H. Robinson, Some Doubts About Arguments
by Hypothetical, 88 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000).
2000]
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The second contributor to the Symposium, Kenneth Simons, from
Boston University School of Law, has written extensively about crimi-
nal and tort law issues from a philosophical perspective. He devotes
most of his article to a careful look at the role community sentiment
might play in a retributive regime.2 Simons notes that, at least on the
surface, most retributivists have been "distinctively inhospitable to
community views about justice," relying instead on more abstract no-
tions about autonomy and the need to redress the moral imbalances
caused when one person harms another." Simons nonetheless tries to
identify several ways in which community sentiments could contribute
to retributive analysis. Perhaps most interesting is his suggestion that
retributivism might set the outer parameters of the criminal law, but at
the same time "permit the state the option of criminalizing and punish-
ing a significant range of behavior [through recognition of an]
'optional' normative space [in which] the expression of community val-
ues through the political process would be consistent with retributive
norms."2' In the end, however, he concludes that "the relevance of
community views to retributive principles is complex and uncertain."29
He goes on to make the same point, more briefly, with respect to the
relevance of community views to utilitarian analysis. Here, he argues
that the issues raised by an instrumental inquiry-issues concerning
which lay views to consider, how much weight they should be given,
and how the cost of securing correspondence between those views and
the content of the criminal law compare to the benefits of increased
compliance (if any)-are just as imponderable as the difficulties raised
by a retributivist approach. °
Norman Finkel, a psychologist at Georgetown University and
author of the book Commonsense Justice,3 is much more optimistic
about the role lay perspectives might play in fashioning criminal law.2
Finkel endorses Robinson's argument that legal legitimacy and compli-
ance would be diminished by gaps between the law and community mo-
res, and adds the contention that because lay people are potential jurors
and jurors are the ultimate arbiters of the law, we risk nullification or
26. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Deserts: Criminal
Law, Punishment Rationales, and Democracy, 28 HoFSTRA L. REv. 635 (2000).
27. See id. at 636-38.
28. Id. at 639.
29. Id. at 640.
30. See id. at 660-64.
31. NoRMANJ. FINKEL, COMMONSENSEJUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OFTHELAW (1995).
32. See Norman J. Finkel, Commonsense Justice, Culpability, and Punishment, 28 HoFSTRA
L. REV. 669 (2000).
[Vol. 28:601
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legal anarchy if the criminal law strays too far from their beliefs.3
Finkel then provides a summary of some of his most important findings
about lay reactions to criminal justice issues, most of which are consis-
tent with the findings of Robinson and Darley.' More importantly, his
research shows that lay views can be quite sophisticated, even though
often at odds with the law. "Commonsense justice," he infers from his
research, "reaches for more ingredients than the Law," and is "decidedly
unformulaic" (in contrast to the law's usual attempt at invariant rules).35
Although lay justice inevitably rests on "past experiences, intuitions,
sentiments, biases, heuristics, construals, and prototypes,"36 it is neither
"naive, gullible, nor pop, for it anchors itself in objective reality, to
what is reasonable."3'7 Finkel clearly believes the law needs to pay atten-
tion to commonsense justice and, although he does not say so, his con-
clusions suggest that jury instructions in criminal cases should be less
constraining and provide more options.
Tom Tyler, another social scientist (specifically a social psycholo-
gist), and John Darley, co-author of Justice, Liability, and Blame, look
more closely at the compliance rationale for recognizing lay views that
both Robinson and Finkel endorse.38 Following Tyler's analysis in his
well-known work, Why People Obey the Law,39 they identify three ways
in which society can try to ensure compliance with the law: deterrence;
the development of a moral consensus as to appropriate behavior; and
the creation of government institutions which are viewed as legitimate
and thus worthy of obeying.4 Tyler and Darley are persuaded that the
latter two methods of creating law-abidingness are as important as de-
terrence, and perhaps even more so. Most people follow the law, they
assert, not out of fear of incurring sanction but because they believe the
33. See id. at 676-79.
34. See id. at 683-701. However, some of his findings vary noticeably, which raises the
methodological issue of whether we can accurately discern community views. For instance, Rob-
inson and Darley's subjects tended to be more willing than Finkel's to endorse an objective ap-
proach to culpability (i.e., one that focuses on the harm caused rather than the subjective intentions
and beliefs of the actor). Compare Slobogin, supra note 19, at 316-318, which describes the results
of Robinson and Darley's studies on attempt, objective, and accomplice liability, with Finkel, su-
pra note 32, at 687, which states that "harm was not the major factor in [the subjects'] culpability
analyses; rather, it remained intent."
35. Finkel, supra note 32, at 701-702.
36. See id.
37. Ik at 706.
38. See Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public
Views About Morality and the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating
Substantive Law, 28 HoFsTRA L. REv. 707 (2000).
39. ToM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
40. See Tyler & Darley, supra note 38, at 708.
20001
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law reflects the right thing to do and because they respect the authorities
who promulgate the law." Thus, compliance can be enhanced by creat-
ing moral consensus and by improving the image of our institutions.
Tyler and Darley note that we can try to accomplish the first goal both
by changing the law to better reflect popular views, as Dean Pound
would have us do,42 and by changing popular views. They also conclude,
however, that in a pluralistic society such as ours-where there may be
an unwillingness or an inability to define a common moral code-
"effective legal regulation may need to be based on the legitimacy of
state authorities. 43 That legitimacy, Tyler's earlier research shows, is
based more on how authorities make decisions than on the precise val-
ues those decisions represent. If, as Tyler and Darley reiterate, "people
often view their own moral values as irrelevant when a legitimate
authority is present," then community views about procedural justice
may be a more important variable in ensuring compliance than the pub-
lic's stance on substantive liability principles.
Deborah Denno, a law professor at Fordham University School of
Law who also has a social science degree, focuses more forthrightly
than any of the other authors on the methodology issue.' Looking
closely at the demographics of Robinson and Darley's subjects, she
suggests that the sample was composed of "extraordinary" rather than
"ordinary" people.46 Reinforcing Tyler's point that moral consensus may
be difficult to obtain in our society, Denno also reports data showing the
widely varying views of different groups, such as whites and blacks, and
males and females, on criminal law matters.47 Finally, Denno argues that
even the collated views of a diverse sample of "ordinary" people are
likely to provide a weak foundation for legal policymaking.48 For in-
41. See id. at 717.
42. See id. at 727-29. As an example of this phenomenon Tyler and Darley use my work
arguing that the United States Supreme Court should consider aligning its definition of "search"
under the Fourth Amendment with societal views on privacy. See Christopher Slobogin and Joseph
E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of Law Enforcement Searches and Seizures, 17 LAW &
HuM. BEHAV. 183 (1993). Arguably a key difference between the search context and the one at
issue here is that the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment protects "expectations
that 'society is prepared to recognize as reasonable,"' thus explicitly defining the law in terms of
community sentiments. Id. at 184 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967))
(Harlan, J., concurring); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979)).
43. Tyler & Darley, supra note 38, at 735.
44. Id. at 736.
45. See Deborah W. Denno, The Perils of Public Opinion, 28 HoFsTRA L. REv. 741 (2000).
46. See id. at 747-50.
47. See id. at 751-52, 55.
48. See id. at 752-57.
[Vol. 28:601
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stance, those views may reflect ignorance of or misperception about
crime, crime rates, offender groups, and legal reforms.49 Moreover, lay
viewpoints on key issues, such as the actus reus for attempt liability,
may vary significantly depending upon the crime in question (e.g., bur-
glary v. homicide) and other aspects of the researcher's scenario (e.g.,
the age and social class of the perpetrator and the victim)." Taken to-
gether, Denno concludes, these types of problems mean that "educating
the public about the law is a preferred route for attempting to ensure that
when the public does influence, it does so wisely."'"
Dan Kahan, from Yale Law School, approaches the relevance-of-
lay-views issue from a different perspective than the other authors.52 He
starts with the proposition, derived from cognitive psychology, that all
of us, including jurors, "make critical judgments, less by reflectively
deducing what is important than by intuitively apprehending it."'53 If so,
Kahan reasons, jurors will apply their own prototypes in arriving at a
verdict regardless of the instructions given.5 If Kahan's speculation
turns out to be true, Dean Pound was right, at least in a sense-the law
as applied by juries will always converge with the standards of the pub-
lic. At the same time, note the consequence of Kahan's surmise for the
non-compliance thesis endorsed by Robinson and Finkel: if verdicts
conform to commonsense justice no matter what the law dictates, the
public is unlikely to become aware of gaps between its views and legal
doctrine. It may be that research on lay views is most usefully employed
not by policymakers seeking legitimacy but by practitioners aiming to
reach the jury.
The reader of these articles cannot help but be impressed with the
complicated nature of the subject. Divining the content of the commu-
nity's views accurately and fairly is a daunting and time-consuming
task. Even if that objective is achieved, a consensus among the citizenry
may not emerge, or any consensus that does surface may stem from
common misimpressions about crime and the legal system, rather than
informed judgments. Assuming we are able to identify accurately the
content of informed commonsense justice, then policymakers still have
49. See id. at 752-54.
50. See id. at 757.
51. Id.at761.
52. See Dan M. Kahan, Lay Perceptions of Justice vs. Criminal Law Doctrine: A False Di-
chotomy?, 28 HoFsTRA L. REv. 793 (2000).
53. Id. at 794.
54. Kahan suggests a test of his hypothesis: Do mock jurors, supplied with the relevant doc-
trine from the Model Penal Code, decide the scenarios any differently than uninstructed subjects?
See id. at 794-95. Another test might be to compare judicial and lay reactions to the scenarios.
200
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to decide among four options when there is a conflict between those
views and a particular legal doctrine: (1) Change the law to conform to
community norms; (2) educate the citizenry about the law's norms and
hope that it will accept, or at least acquiesce in, the divergence; (3) de-
ceive the public about the difference (or perhaps avoid surveying it in
the first place) so as to avoid generating hostility toward the law; or, in
what may amount to the same thing, (4) ignore community sentiment.
Although my preference is for the second approach when the legal doc-
trine in question is well-grounded in retributive or utilitarian principles,
I confess to greater ambivalence about that position now that I have read
the articles in this Symposium.
Surprisingly in this democratic society, there is very little commen-
tary examining whether and why community views are important com-
ponents of legal analysis and how we might go about determining what
those views are. This issue of the Hofstra Law Review begins that explo-
ration. It is hoped that the Articles published here will trigger a broad
discussion on the usefulness of community sentiment to legal policy-
making.
[Vol. 28:601
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